Antineutrino monitoring of spent nuclear fuel by Brdar, Vedran et al.
MITP/16-058
Antineutrino monitoring of spent nuclear fuel
Vedran Brdar,1, ∗ Patrick Huber,2, † and Joachim Kopp1, ‡
1PRISMA Cluster of Excellence & Mainz Institute for Theoretical Physics,
Johannes Gutenberg University, Staudingerweg 7, 55099 Mainz, Germany
2Center for Neutrino Physics, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg 24061, USA
(Dated: December 25, 2017)
Military and civilian applications of nuclear energy have left a significant amount of spent nuclear
fuel over the past 70 years. Currently, in many countries world wide, the use of nuclear energy
is on the rise. Therefore, the management of highly radioactive nuclear waste is a pressing issue.
In this letter, we explore antineutrino detectors as a tool for monitoring and safeguarding nuclear
waste material. We compute the flux and spectrum of antineutrinos emitted by spent nuclear fuel
elements as a function of time, and we illustrate the usefulness of antineutrino detectors in several
benchmark scenarios. In particular, we demonstrate how a measurement of the antineutrino flux
can help to re-verify the contents of a dry storage cask in case the monitoring chain by conventional
means gets disrupted. We then comment on the usefulness of antineutrino detectors at long-term
storage facilities such as Yucca mountain. Finally, we put forward antineutrino detection as a tool
in locating underground “hot spots” in contaminated areas such as the Hanford site in Washington
state.
I. INTRODUCTION
With carbon dioxide induced climate change and the
scarceness of fossil fuels becoming imminent problems
for humanity, nuclear energy is undergoing a renaissance.
However, nuclear technology comes with a number of in-
trinsic problems, such as the limited availability of nu-
clear fuel, the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons
technology, the risk of major accidents, and the manage-
ment of highly radioactive waste. As a result, nuclear
energy is relatively expensive compared to many other
energy sources.
In this letter, we will in particular focus on the waste
issue: we will argue that a measurement of the antineu-
trino flux emitted by beta-decaying isotopes can be a
unique component in a multi-faceted approach to moni-
toring and safeguarding nuclear waste repositories. The
unique advantage of antineutrinos is that they penetrate
the shielding surrounding the repository and thus offer a
direct method for remotely probing the nuclear material
inside. Other probes like gamma rays or neutrons, see
for instance Ref. [1], are heavily attenuated by the ma-
terials they need to traverse on the way to a detector1.
Therefore, relating their measured fluxes to the actual
content of the repository requires a sophisticated propa-
gation model, which in turn relies on an accurate knowl-
edge of the contents of the repository. This cyclic depen-
dence on information is one of the major limitations of
conventional monitoring methods. On the downside, the
very fact that antineutrinos are not attenuated even by a
whole mountain, implies that antineutrino detection has
∗ vbrdar@uni-mainz.de
† pahuber@vt.edu
‡ jkopp@uni-mainz.de
1 For a recent study on muon radiography applied to the problem
at hand, see [2].
to deal with very small cross sections . 10−41 cm2 [3].
Any meaningful flux measurement thus requires the de-
ployment of a large detector with at least several tons of
active material for a time period of order months.
Nevertheless, thanks to advances in detector technol-
ogy, this appears feasible at a comparatively reasonable
cost. In fact, practical applications of antineutrino detec-
tors in the nuclear industry have been discussed for a long
time, mostly in the context of monitoring power reac-
tors [4–10]. Several detectors have been built to demon-
strate the feasibility of such applications [11, 12], and
further studies are planned in current and future experi-
ments [13].
In the following, we will first compute the antineutrino
flux and spectrum emitted by spent nuclear fuel, and then
consider several scenarios in which antineutrino detectors
can be used in the context of radioactive waste reposito-
ries.
II. ANTINEUTRINO EMISSION FROM SPENT
NUCLEAR FUEL
For the first 1,000–10,000 years after discharge from a
reactor, the total activity of spent nuclear fuel is nearly
exclusively caused by beta decays (and the associated
gamma emission). Therefore, a large number of an-
tineutrinos is produced. However, detection by inverse
beta decay, ν¯e + p → n + e+, the main detection re-
action for electron antineutrinos, requires antineutrino
energies of at least 1.8 MeV. The lifetime of a beta de-
caying nucleus scales roughly like Q5, where Q is the en-
ergy released in the decay. Therefore, the detectable an-
tineutrino signal for most fission fragments decays within
hours to days after fission ends. There is, however, a
handful of isotopes that have a two stage decay, where
the first decay has very small Q and thus a resulting long
lifetime, followed by a fast decay with Q > 1.8 MeV.
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FIG. 1. The spectrum of electron antineutrinos emitted by
spent nuclear fuel as a function of the time after discharge
from the reactor. We also indicate in gray the area below the
threshold for inverse beta decay, the dominant antineutrino
detection process, at 1.8 MeV. The data underlying this plot
is available in the supplemental material [20].
The most notable example is strontium-90, which de-
cays with a half-life of 28.90 yrs to yttrium-90, which
in turn decays within hours to the stable zirconium-90
with Q = 2.22801 MeV [14]. Strontium-90 is produced
in around 5% of all fission events [15–17]. The isotopes
with the next longest lifetimes with antineutrino emission
above 1.8 MeV in their decay chains are ruthenium-106
(371.8 days [18]) and cerium-144 (284.91 days [19]). As a
result, the detectable antineutrino emission of spent nu-
clear fuel after more than a few years is entirely given
by strontium-90. It is worth noting that strontium-90
(like all other fission fragments) remains in the high-level
waste resulting from reprocessing using the widely em-
ployed PUREX process. In fig. 1, we plot the number
of electron antineutrinos emitted per second, per MeV,
and per ton of spent nuclear fuel as a function of an-
tineutrino energy for fuel elements of different age. We
assume a burnup2 of 45 GW days. As expected, we ob-
serve a softening of the spectrum over time, as short-lived
isotopes with large Q values decay away. Note, however,
that even after 100 yrs, a non-zero flux remains above
the energy threshold of 1.8 MeV for inverse beta decay.
III. DRY CASK STORAGE FACILITIES
As long term storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel are
becoming available only slowly, temporary storage solu-
2 Burnup is a measure of how much energy per unit mass has been
extracted from nuclear fuel. It is directly proportional to the
total number of fissions and thus to the strontium-90 content
and the antineutrino emission rate.
tions have become a necessity. Once fuel elements have
been allowed to cool in a spent fuel pool for ∼ 10 yrs
[21, 22] after discharge from the reactor, they are typi-
cally transferred to dry storage casks, large shielded steel
cylinders several meters tall, each of them holding ∼ 14–
24 tons of spent nuclear fuel elements with a uranium
content of 10–17 tons [22–24]. The layout of a typical dry
storage facility is shown in fig. 2. Even though safety and
security measures are in place to protect such facilities,
manipulations are imaginable. The core of the IAEA’s
(International Atomic Energy Agency’s) methodology for
spent fuel is so-called continuity of knowledge (CoK): the
amount and type of fuel loaded into a cask is monitored
and recorded, the cask is closed, and a tamper-proof seal
is applied. As long as the seal is intact and the records
are available, the resulting CoK allows to infer with a
great deal of certainty the contents of the cask. How-
ever, even during routine operations it is conceivable that
records are inaccurate or lost or that seals are compro-
mised. Several methods based on on neutron or gamma
ray detection are under development to restore CoK in
this case, see for instance [1].
Here, we envision instead the deployment of an an-
tineutrino detector, with a fiducial target mass3 of order
∼ 20 tons, close to the storage casks for several months.
Using as an example the storage facility at the Surry Nu-
clear Power Station in the U.S., where casks hold 9–16
metric tons of uranium (MTU), we assume that 50% of
the radioactive material from two of the 15 MTU casks
(colored in red in fig. 2) goes missing. This roughly cor-
responds to removing 3% of the total amount of nuclear
waste stored at Surry. We make no claim that an actual
diversion case would have any similarity to this scenario
nor that this could occur as part of routine operations, it
merely serves to indicate the general level of sensitivity
we might expect from antineutrino monitoring.
To determine what it takes to discover such an
anomaly, we simulate the expected number of detected
antineutrino events as a function of the detector position
for the two hypothesis “all storage casks full” (F ) and
“50% of nuclear material missing in two casks” (M). We
use the antineutrino spectrum given by the blue dashed
curve in fig. 1 (10 years after discharge) and the inverse
beta decay cross sections from [3]. Neutrino oscillation
effects, though small, are taken into account, with the
oscillation parameters given in [25]. The rate of antineu-
trino events per ton of fiducial detector mass and per
MTU of source mass is
Nν = 5.17 yr
−1 ton−1 MTU−1 ×
(
10 m
d
)2
, (1)
where d is the distance between the source and the de-
tector (both treated as point-like). This number depends
3 The fiducial detector mass is the effective mass, after accounting
for fiducial volume cuts and efficiency factors introduced in event
reconstruction and analysis.
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FIG. 2. The dry storage facility at the Surry Nuclear Power
Plant in Virginia, USA [23]. Filled storage casks, highlighted
in yellow, contain 9–16 MTU each. In the benchmark scenario
discussed in the text, we assume that 50% of the spent fuel
in two 15 MTU casks (marked in red) have gone missing.
Colored contours indicate the exposure (in ton yrs) required
to establish the loss of nuclear material at the 90% confidence
level.
mildly on the time after discharge and is for instance re-
duced by ∼ 5% one year later. In the following, we will
always assume measurement campaigns lasting one year
or less and therefore neglect this small effect.
The irreducible background to the measurement in-
cludes antineutrinos from running nuclear reactors with
an expected event rate of
Nbg = 359 yr
−1 ton−1 GWth−1 ×
(
km
d
)2
. (2)
For the 5.2 GWth (thermal power) reactor in Surry, lo-
cated d ∼ 1 km away from the envisioned 20 ton de-
tector, this leads to ∼ 37 300 antineutrino events per
year. We take this background into account in our sim-
ulations. Backgrounds from other power stations and
from radioactive decays in the Earth (geo-neutrinos) are
smaller by at least a factor ∼ 10−4, and we therefore
neglect them.
The dominant reducible backgrounds arise from ra-
dioactive decays and cosmic ray interactions mimicking
an antineutrino signal. With current single-volume liq-
uid scintillator detectors like Double Chooz, RENO, and
Daya Bay, when deployed at the surface, these back-
grounds would be a factor 10–10 000 larger than the an-
ticipated antineutrino signal. Current detectors identify
signal candidates by looking for a delayed coincidence
between a primary particle and a delayed neutron cap-
ture. However, they are not able to exploit the spa-
tial correlations between the primary and delayed sig-
nals, nor can they tell whether the primary particles is a
positron, as in inverse beta decay, or a photon or electron,
as in most background events. Fortunately, these short-
comings could be overcome in a detector with sufficient
spatial resolution to tag positrons by resolving the two
511 keV x-rays from their annihilation [26]. Prototypes
of detectors with this capability exist and have been suc-
cessfully operated in particular by the SoLid and CHAN-
DLER collaborations [13]. Currently, an improvement
of the signal-to-background ratio by a factor of 1 000
is achievable, and further improvements appear feasible
with improved shielding and an increased concentration
of neutron capture targets like lithium-6. It thus appears
plausible that within a few years even the low rate of an-
tineutrinos from nuclear waste will become detectable in
surface detectors. In the following, we will assume that
this has been achieved by the time the proposed mea-
surements are carried out, and we will neglect reducible
backgrounds.
Events are divided into 0.2 MeV wide energy bins. De-
noting the number of signal events expected under the
two alternative hypotheses by Fi andMi, and the number
of background events by Bi, we define the test statistic
χ2 ≡ 2
∑
i
{
Fi −Mi + (Mi +Bi) log
[
Mi +Bi
Fi +Bi
]}
, (3)
which follows a χ2 distribution.
The results of the analysis are represented by the
contours in fig. 2 which indicate where the antineu-
trino detector should be placed in order to establish the
flux deficit at the 90% confidence level with 20 ton yrs,
40 ton yrs, and 80 ton yrs of exposure, respectively. We
see that the detector needs to be placed within ∼ 50 me-
ters of the affected casks in order to collect the ∼ 4000
events needed for the measurement.
IV. APPLICATION TO LONG-TERM
STORAGE FACILITIES
Above-ground storage of spent nuclear fuel, while
widely used, is only a temporary solution, and the long-
term goal must be to establish underground repositories
that can keep radioactive material out of the biosphere
for 104–106 years [27]. The usefulness of antineutrino de-
tectors at such geological repositories is limited by the
low antineutrino fluxes after strontium-90 has decayed
away (half-life 28.8 yrs). Moreover, in order not to dis-
turb the repository, construction of antineutrino detec-
tors seems feasible and useful only at distances of order
100 meters or larger.
To illustrate the prospects of detecting antineutrinos
from a geological nuclear waste repository, we show in
fig. 3 the signal event rates expected at the proposed
Yucca mountain repository in Nevada, which would hold
70 000 MTU of radioactive material, stored ∼ 300 m un-
derground. We see that even a small detector (∼ 10 tons)
located at the surface would see an appreciable event
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FIG. 3. The planned long term storage facility at Yucca
mountain. The yellow grid indicates the drifts holding the
radioactive material at a depth of 300 m below the surface,
while red and orange contours show the expected antineu-
trino count rates for a detector at the surface.
rate. With a kiloton-scale instrument like KamLAND
[28] or the planned JUNO experiment [29], count rates
would be significantly larger, especially when such a de-
tector is placed in an underground location closer to the
repository. Even then, however, it would only be pos-
sible to detect cataclysmic disruptions of the repository.
More typical (but nevertheless highly dangerous) failure
scenarios that involve the leakage of only a small amount
of nuclear material into the surrounding soil would not
be detectable. This may change, however, once detec-
tor technology with better directional sensitivity becomes
available (see below).
V. LEAKAGE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AT
THE HANFORD SITE
Sometimes, nuclear oversight agencies are faced with
the challenge to secure or decommission a nuclear waste
repository in which the contents, and perhaps even the
underground location, of storage casks are not known.
An example is the Hanford site in the state of Washing-
ton (USA), where plutonium for military purposes was
produced from 1944 to 1987. At Hanford, a major prob-
lem is the leakage of storage containers for high level
nuclear waste, leading to radioactive contamination of
ground water [30, 31].
Consider first a scenario where the location of storage
tanks is known, but their precise content is not. We will
focus on one particular array of storage tanks at Han-
ford, the T tank farm [30], which consists of 16 tanks,
arranged in a 4 × 4 grid measuring ∼ 120 m × 80 m and
originally containing between 0.2 and 5 MTU of spent
fuel each. We assume the nuclear material in the tanks
was discharged from a reactor 50 years ago. With a de-
tector placed 30 meters from the most massive (5 MTU)
tank, and taking into account background antineutrinos
from other storage tanks and from the Columbia nuclear
power plant (30 km away, 3.5 GW thermal power), the
amount of material in that tank can be measured with
an uncertainty of ±2.1 MTU for an exposure of 20 ton yrs
(35 signal events) and with an uncertainty of ±1.1 MTU
for an exposure of 80 ton yrs (140 signal events). The
age of the nuclear material (i.e. the time after discharge)
can be determined to lie between 44 yrs and 54 yrs with
80 ton yrs of exposure, assuming the true age is 50 yrs.
Assume now that a fraction of the radioactive mate-
rial in the most massive tank is slowly leaking out. We
model this situation by reducing the inventory of the tank
and introducing a secondary point source containing the
leaked material 20 meters below its original location. De-
tecting such leakage seems unfeasible with established de-
tector technologies, but requires antineutrino detectors
that not only measure energy, but also the direction of
incoming antineutrinos. Some preliminary efforts in this
direction have been undertaken [26, 32, 33], but a work-
ing detector is still far off. As one of the goals of the
present study is to motivate further R&D in this field,
we will in the following assume the availability of a com-
pact detector with an expected angular resolution down
to O(10) degrees [26, 34]. We bin events in the cosine of
the zenith angle, cos θ, (5 bins) and the azimuth angle
φ (9 bins). We use a highly simplified model of angular
smearing in terms of a Gaussian with a width of 20 de-
grees. For simplicity, we integrate over energy, assuming
that the time of discharge and thus the antineutrino en-
ergy spectrum are known already. We estimate that by
deploying a directionally sensitive 20 ton detector at a
distance of 30 meters from the damaged tank, leakage
of 55% of the tank’s content can be discovered at 90%
CL after 12 months (30 signal events). With an 80 ton
detector, detection of 25% leakage is possible.
VI. RADIOACTIVE SPILL AT HANFORD
BUILDING 324
As a further application scenario, we consider an actual
spill of radioactive material that happened in October
1986 in a radiochemical plant at Hanford known as Build-
ing 324. At the time, a large amount of strontium-90 and
caesium-137, with a total activity of 1.3 MCi was released
from a hot cell. Half of it leaked into the ground and is
now presumed to be located within a 10 meter×10 meter
area about 2 meters below ground level [31]. In 2010,
5a pit was excavated ∼ 20 meters from the spill to drive
long steel pipes into the affected area, thus allowing the
deployment of temperature and activity sensors. This
method has the disadvantage that it allows moisture to
enter the contaminated soil, which may ultimately allow
radioactive material to seep further into the ground, pos-
sibly reaching ground water levels. For future incidents
of this type, we therefore consider the deployment of an-
tineutrino detectors for remote sensing. Modeling the
spill as a point source at a depth of 2 m, and assuming
the availability of an 80 ton antineutrino detector with
angular sensitivity located 30 m away at the same depth,
we find that a further downward shift of the nuclear ma-
terial by 3.5 m is detectable at the 90% CL after one year
of exposure.
VII. LOCALIZING NUCLEAR WASTE
CONTAINERS
Let us now turn to a more speculative scenario where
neither the exact location nor the contents of storage
casks are known. This could happen, for instance, when
documentation is lost and localization using other meth-
ods like ground-penetrating radar is not feasible, for in-
stance in a scenario where many casks are buried under-
ground, but only few contain high level nuclear waste.
We envision successive or simultaneous deployment of
80 ton antineutrino detectors on a two-dimensional grid
with a spacing of 250 m. We again assume angular sen-
sitivity, but since the distance between detectors and
sources is large, the zenith angle measurement is irrel-
evant and can be discarded. Figure 4 illustrates the out-
come of such an analysis for four randomly placed stor-
age casks of unknown content and for an exposure of
80 ton yrs per detector. Using a stochastic optimization
method, we fit the positions (xj , yj) and activities mj of
the four sources. Colored contours show the dependence
of the test statistic χ2 (defined in analogy to eq. (3)) on
the fit values of (x1, y1), with the other (xj , yj) as well as
all mj allowed to float. We see that storage casks can be
localized to within tens of meters. For further refinement
of their position (for instance in order to guide cleanup
efforts), the procedure can be repeated with detectors
moved closer to the source positions determined in the
initial scan. With a ∼ 30 m spacing between detectors,
the position of each source can be determined to O(m)
accuracy.
VIII. SUMMARY
We have calculated the antineutrino flux and spectrum
from spent nuclear fuel, and have used these results to
outline possible applications of antineutrino detectors in
monitoring and managing nuclear waste repositories. We
have shown that, in a specific diversion scenario at a dry
cask storage facility, installation of an antineutrino detec-
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FIG. 4. Using antineutrino detectors (brown ⊕ symbols) to
localize nuclear waste storage casks (radioactive hazard sym-
bols). Colored contours indicate the accuracy with which
casks can be localized (see text for details). We have as-
sumed an exposure of 80 t yrs per detector, and we have used
the antineutrino spectrum expected 50 years after discharge
from a reactor.
tor could allow oversight agencies to remotely detect leak-
age or theft of the stored nuclear waste. Further study
is needed to assess the applicability of the method to
other diversion scenarios. At long term geological repos-
itories, a significant antineutrino flux is expected, but
detecting realistic anomalies such as leakage of a small
amount of radioactive material would require advanced
detector technologies with angular sensitivity. Such de-
tectors could also help in the decommissioning of nuclear
installations like the Hanford site, where they would al-
low for the localization of nuclear material and for the
characterization of spills.
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